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"An Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains"1
Chief Justice Marshall articulated this fundamental canon of U.S. statutory
construction, reflective of customary international law, in 1804 in Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, an admiralty case commonly referred to as the
"Charming Betsy" case. As the foreign government representative on this
panel, I would like to provide an extraterritorial perspective on the extraterri-
torial application of domestic law following the Charming Betsy principle.
I. CANADA'S POSITION ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Let me start by saying that Canada does not object to the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction per se. Canada exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction
pursuant to multilateral treaties for egregious offences such as those found in the
Convention against Torture. However, Canada is opposed, in principle, to
broad assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over Canadian individuals and
entities arising out of activities that take place entirely outside of the state assert-
ing jurisdiction. This assertion ofjurisdiction interferes with the sovereignty of
governments and is not in conformity with international law. Under inter-
national law, the limitations on the extent to which any single nation can extend
its own jurisdiction are generally recognized as flowing from the sovereignty
and equality of nations.
* Foreign Affairs Canada in Ottowa, Deputy Director, United Nations Human Rights and
Economic Law Division. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International
Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October
20 to 22, 2004.
1. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
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II. EMPAGRAN
It was on the basis of this principle that Canada intervened as amicus
curiae in the F. Hoffinann- Laroche Ltd et al v. Empagran case (referred to as
Empagran) heard by the United States Supreme Court on April 26, 2004,
decision rendered on June 14, 2004.
I will be focusing my comments on the Empagran decision as it articulates
the Supreme Court's views on the extraterritorial application of antitrust law.
It also cited the Canadian brief and supported the Canadian position.
The Empagran case involved vitamin sellers (a vitamin cartel) around the
world that agreed to fix prices, leading to higher vitamin prices in the U.S. and
independently to higher prices in other countries. Foreign purchasers filed a
class action under U.S. antitrust law (the Sherman Act) alleging the vitamin
sellers had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy. The Court stated that a pur-
chaser of the vitamins in the United States could bring a claim under U.S. anti-
trust legislation. However, the plaintiffs in the Empagran case never asserted
they purchased vitamins in the United States. Therefore, the Court was essen-
tially left to determine first whether the conduct in question involved trade or
commerce with foreign nations and if so, did the conduct have a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce.2 These
were the criteria to determine if the Sherman Act would apply.
In its consideration of the issue, the Court referred to the amici curiae filed
by Germany, Canada, Japan, and the United States.
III. CANADA'S AMICUS CURIAE
Before I get to the Court's analysis of the application of the Sherman Act,
I would like to give you a sense of the perspective Canada presented to the
Court. The Government of Canada submitted that recognized legal principles
militate against the broad extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act under
the circumstances of this case. United States legal principles limit the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-nationals when such exercise is "unrea-
sonable." These principles parallel principles of international law and comity
that are recognized and applied by Canada and other nations.
The legal principles that foreclose the unreasonable exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction had ready application to the facts of this case. The four
factors applied by U.S. courts to determine the reasonableness of an exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction relate to a nexus with U.S. territory, to a nexus with
U.S. nationals, to other countries' interest in regulation, and to conflict with
other countries regulation. Canada argued, that from the perspective of the
United States, the respondents were foreign nationals. The transactions on
2. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2363 (2004).
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which they base their claims occurred solely in foreign commerce and had no
effects in the United States or on U.S. commerce. Canada and other nations
have a strong interest in regulating, and do regulate the type of activity on which
respondent's claim are based. In Canada, members of the vitamin cartel were
prosecuted under the Competition Act in respect of criminally sanctioned cartel
activity and its domestic effects. Prosecutions also occurred in the European
Union, Australia, and the U.S. Record fines were levied within these jurisdic-
tions against the cartel members.
The laws of some countries, including those of Canada and the U.S., enable
private parties to seek compensation in a civil suit for damages for financial
injury suffered as a result of the activity of cartel members in the domestic
market. While Canada, and most other countries, allow recovery only of the
actual damages suffered, plaintiffs in the U.S. are entitled to treble damages if
their suit is successful. The assertion of U.S. jurisdiction would conflict with
Canada's enforcement of its own antitrust regime as it would, inter alia, under-
cut Canada's immunity program that gives cartel members incentive to report
their illegal activity and cooperate with other authorities, because criminal
immunity from Canadian authorities would come at the increased cost of
punitive treble damages under U.S. law for its worldwide transactions. Canada
concluded that it would be unreasonable for U.S. courts to exercise the juris-
diction requested by the foreign plaintiffs.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS TEST
The Court concluded that the Sherman Act did not apply. Citing, inter
alia, the Charming Betsy, the Court commenced its analysis with the principle
that it ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable inter-
ference with the sovereign authority of other nations. This allows potentially
conflicting laws of different nations to work together. The Court found that
application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct to redress
domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused is
reasonable. It is however not reasonable to apply U.S. law when it is foreign
harm alone that gives rise to the plaintiffs claim. The Court asked why should
American law supplant Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determina-
tion on how to protect their own people from anticompetitive conduct engaged
in by their own companies. It noted that several nations filed briefs (Germany,
Canada, Japan) arguing that applying U.S. remedies would unjustifiably permit
the German, Canadian, and Japanese citizens to bypass their own less generous
remedial schemes and that permitting foreign plaintiffs to pursue private treble
damages remedies would undermine foreign nations own antitrust enforcement
policies by diminishing foreign firms incentive to cooperate with antitrust
authorities in return for prosecutorial amnesty.
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The Court then concluded that "if America's antitrust policies could not
win their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we
must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperia-
lism, through legislative fiat."3
The Supreme Court could not have been more clear on the facts. Statutes
are to be construed to avoid unreasonable interference with other nations
sovereign authority--effectively a restatement of the Charming Betsy, custo-
mary international law-200 years later.
3. Id. at 2369.
